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THE WAYS OF A JUDGE AND ON APPEAL*
Kermit V. Lipez**
INTRODUCTION
What do you do when your judicial hero, the author of two
important books on appellate judging, was for many years your
neighbor, friend, colleague, and mentor? You revel in your good
fortune, and you share your admiration for his books.
In his extraordinary career, Judge Frank Coffin was an
accomplished trial lawyer, the architect, along with his good
friend, Senator Edmund S. Muskie, of the modem Democratic
Party of Maine, a chairman of the state party, a two-term
Congressman, an unsuccessful candidate for Governor, a deputy
administrator of the Agency for International Development, and
a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. That service in the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of our government reflects a breadth of experience that
few people can match.
Judge Coffin's long involvement in the political world
contributed significantly to a primary focus of his two books on
appellate judging, The Ways of a Judge, published in 1980,' and2
On Appeal, published in 1994. As a political organizer, a
* The author of these books, Judge Frank M. Coffin, was a member of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit from 1964 until his death in December 2009,
including eleven years as its Chief Judge. Although Judge Coffin had retired from daily
judicial duties in 2006, he retained his status as a senior federal judge for the rest of his life.
** Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. I wish to thank my
permanent law clerk, Barbara Riegelhaupt, for carefully editing this essay. Barbara was a
law clerk for Judge Coffin for twenty-two years before she began working for me. Her
tenure reflects her exceptional ability. To the extent that Barbara channels Judge Coffin on
my behalf, that is a considerable plus.
1. Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the Federal Appellate
Bench (Houghton Mifflin 1980).
2. Frank M. Coffin, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and Judging (W. W. Norton &
Co., Inc. 1994).
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candidate for public office, a Congressman, and an administrator
in a federal agency, Judge Coffin understood his accountability
to constituents, legislative committees, and appointing
authorities. Although his life tenure on the Court of Appeals
made him immune to the vagaries of election or appointment,
Judge Coffin retained a keen awareness of the need to legitimize
his work-and the work of all judges-to the public at large.
Indeed, Judge Coffin recognized that federal judges had a
particular need to explain themselves to a wary public. With its
lifetime appointments and constitutionally conceived
independence, the federal judiciary is an anti-majoritarian
institution. That independence invites the familiar charge that
the judges use their authority to impose their personal
preferences on the public. Appellate judges are accused of
writing decisions that, despite the trappings of precedent and
logic, are nothing but a camouflage for instinct, bias, or hunch.
They are criticized for creating law that undermines the
politically accountable institutions of our government. In short,
the unaccountable judges are charged with acting in
unaccountable ways.
Aware that such criticisms are abetted by the lack of
transparency in an appellate judge's work,3 Judge Coffin
undertook to remedy the problem as only a man of his gifts and
experience could. By describing his own decisionmaking and
work habits, he could demystify the decisionmaking process of
federal appellate judges and, by so doing, legitimize it. This
would be no small feat. It is not easy to be an observer of one's
work, particularly when the essence of the work is something as
evanescent as a decision. And there is always the possibility that
the revelations about the ways of a judge might not be
reassuring.
Whatever the validity of such difficulties and dangers, they
did not deter Judge Coffin. He believed that the task of judging
requires self-consciousness about the decisionmaking process-
understanding how it unfolds and the factors that influence it-
and the ability to explain why that process led to a particular
3. Judge Coffin crisply describes the problem: "The judges sit in a phalanx behind
their elevated bench, listen to argument, ask a few questions, and, weeks or months later,
issue an opinion. Exactly what goes on, if anything, between argument and decision is
veiled in mystery." The Ways of a Judge, supra n. 1, at 4.
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outcome. He reports in The Ways of a Judge that throughout his
first decade and a half on the bench he would make notes about
the process of judging-observing stubborn problems,
approaches that worked, and methods of craftsmanship-that
would help him to examine and reflect on his own judging.4
Judge Coffin embraced the challenge of opening that
introspective process, as much as possible, to the public.
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that Judge
Coffin's two books on the appellate process are devoted solely
to the elusive concept of judicial decisionmaking. Here again
Judge Coffin's roots in the detail-rich world of the trial lawyer
and the nuts and bolts of political organization and political
campaigning are telling. He does not pursue his larger themes
about the nature of judicial decisionmaking until he anchors his
conclusions in the details of the appellate process and the work
that takes place in a judge's chambers. In his first book, The
Ways of a Judge, there are chapters on "The Appellate Idea in
the United States," "The Elements of Deciding Appeals," "Place
and Patterns of Work," "Preparing for Argument," and "A Term
of Court." In On Appeal, there are chapters on "The State-
Federal Court System: One Whole," "In Chambers," "Where
Appeals Begin," "The Judges' Conference," and "Working with
Law Clerks."
Written in a graceful, pleasing style, and carefully
organized to lead the reader through the stages of the appellate
process, these chapters, and others like them, describe in
entertaining detail all aspects of the appellate process, both the
public process that takes place in the courtroom and the process
away from public view-the judges working together to reach a
decision and the judge working with law clerks to craft an
opinion explaining that decision. The answer to almost any
question about the appellate process can be found in one of
Judge Coffin's books.
4. These ruminations were informal and spontaneous: "Whenever the spirit moved
and time allowed-in an airplane, hotel room, or restaurant, even on the bench-I would
scribble on tickets, menus, court docket lists, even baggage checks." The Ways of a Judge,
supra n. 1, at 3. His object, he explains, was "to keep my ruminating self at enough
distance from my operating self so that the former could observe the latter with some sense
of perspective." Id.
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For example, Judge Coffin tells us that the modem "brief'
(which he observes is "usually anything but") "brazenly carr[iesl
the name once reserved for a slip of paper listing a few cases."
The English barrister would hand the slip to the judge on the
bench, who might send the bailiff to retrieve a case noted on it.6
There are hundreds of such intriguing details in Judge Coffin's
books, which add much to the pleasure of reading them.
However, those interesting details are merely the
indispensable prelude to the larger subject of appellate
decisionmaking that Judge Coffin addresses at the end of each of
his books. The judicial process produces winners and losers. The
appellate courts give content to civil liberties, confirm or vacate
sizeable jury awards, resolve the inescapable ambiguities in
statutes, establish rules of conduct for businesses, decide issues
of crime and punishment, and occasionally declare statutes
unconstitutional. The stakes in understanding appellate
decisionmaking are high, for the parties going through the
process and for the larger public who give such power to their
judges. Judge Coffin wrote his books, in substantial part, to
explain why that power has not been misplaced.
THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE BENCH
Despite the large ambition behind his writings on the
appellate process, the title of Judge Coffin's first book bespeaks
his personal modest. He disclaims any intent to speak for
anyone but himself: "This is a personal document. I do not
claim to speak for all judges, all appellate judges, or even all
federal appellate judges. I write only of my own work ways and
thought ways, but I hope to reflect basic values widely held."8
His primary purpose is "to shed as much light as possible on the
subject of judging" so that non-judges may understand judges
5. The Ways ofaJudge, supra n. 1, at 55 n.*
6. Id.
7. Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
is one jurist who has taken a different approach. See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think
(Harv. U. Press 2008).
8. The Ways of a Judge, supra n. 1, at 14.
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and the appellate process, 9 which ideally will lead to their
respect for, and confidence in, the system.'
However, Judge Coffin is careful to circumscribe the
expectations for his own inquiry. He acknowledges that the
decisionmaking process will always be shrouded in some
mystery: "[U]nless a judge were an extraordinary introvert and a
psychiatrically trained one at that, he could not begin to describe
with candor and completeness what goes on in a judicial mind in
the deciding of a case."' 1 He further observes that judges are not
"jurisprudents"; they reach most decisions "without trying to taN
the wellsprings of jurisprudential or moral philosophy."
Between the inaccessible terrains of the psychoanalyst and the
philosopher, there is the more accessible terrain of the self-
aware craftsman, whose skills and values can be described and
defended.
Judge Coffin operates largely in the craftsman's middle
terrain where most cases are decided. Despite the controversy
generated by a few highly publicized cases, the vast majority of
cases decided by appellate judges are not the "great" cases
involving unsettled principles of constitutional law or issues of
first impression. Instead, they are cases involving the application
of settled principles to different facts and the familiar issues at
the heart of appellate judging: Did the trial court's dismissal of
the case reflect a proper understanding of the law? Were the
evidentiary objections and the objections to the jury instructions
properly preserved? Were the erroneous evidentiary rulings
harmless? Was there enough evidence to support the award of
damages or the criminal conviction? Did the trial court properly
apply the summary judgment standard? And on and on.
The familiarity of these issues does not mean that the cases
that turn on them are easy or unimportant. To the contrary, these
cases are always important to the parties and they can be
important for the development of the law. Also, deciding these
9. Id. at 246.
10. Although Judge Coffin's insights are most pertinent to the experience of judges on
the United States Court of Appeals, who enjoy the benefit of life tenure, his reflections on
the processes of appellate decisionmaking and the importance of transparency have much
to offer judges on other courts as well.
11. Id. at 195.
12. Id. at 205.
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familiar issues can require exceedingly difficult judgments
whose ostensible certainty conceals the uncertainty and shifting
judgments that preceded them.
As Judge Coffin notes, the "decision" in many cases does
not occur at the beginning of the process, and it is just as
unlikely to happen only once during the judge's work on a case.
He describes the fluid nature of the decisionmaking process as
the judge reads the briefs, discusses the case in chambers with
law clerks, listens to argument, and confers with colleagues: "I
see the process ... as a series of shifting biases. It is much like
tracing the source of a river, following various minor tributaries,
which are found to rise in swamps, returning to the channel,
which narrows as one goes upstream."' 3 He identifies the "craft-
related factors" that contribute to this narrowing and that, in the
end, will decide most cases:
a case on point or clearly analogous, analysis of the
evidence or a ruling by the trial court, a procedural or
jurisdictional requirement, a compelling public policy, a
close reading of legislative history, and considerations of
institutional appropriateness.'
4
In most cases, these factors will bring together judicial
colleagues whose backgrounds and philosophies vary widely,
leading to consensus on both the outcome and the approach.1
5
13. Id. at 63. Judge Coffin's more literal description of this exploration provides a
window into what he describes as the appellate judge's "state of prolonged indecisiveness"
in hard cases:
One reads a good brief from the appellant; the position seems reasonable. But a
good brief from appellee, bolstered perhaps by a trial judge's opinion, seems
incontrovertible. Discussion with the law clerks in chambers casts doubt on any
tentative position. Any such doubt may be demolished by oral argument, only to
give rise to a new bias, which in turn may be shaken by the postargument
conference among the judges. As research and writing reveal new problems, the
tentative disposition of the panel of judges may appear wrong. The opinion is
written and circulated, producing reactions from the other judges, which again
change the thrust, the rationale, or even the result. Only when the process has
ended can one say that the decision has been made, after as many as seven turns
in the road. The guarantee of a judge's impartiality lies not in suspending
judgment throughout the process but in recognizing that each successive
judgment is tentative, fragile, and likely to be modified or set aside as a
consequence of deepened insight.
Id.
14. Id. at 197.
15. Id.
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At the same time, however, Judge Coffin acknowledges
that "[a]lthough the skills of the craft determine the outcome of
most cases, the public and the press sense that in some of the
most important cases there is more at work than professional
judgment alone."' 6 In these important cases, which often involve
constitutional challenges to the exercise of government
authority, "the public instinct is well if not accurately grounded,
for a judge does inevitably have moral values and personal
views about the causes and cures of our society's ills.'
17
Judges are fallible human beings who may be susceptible
"to certain inflammatory stimuli," such as hostility to a
controversial public figure, a preference for a political party, a
preexisting view of the strengths and weaknesses of the trial
judge, or an attitude toward counsel affected by reputation. Such
value judgments, more accurately described as prejudices, "can
and should be identified, exposed to self-conscious analysis, and
ruthlessly excised as far as humanly possible before decisions
are made."'18 Otherwise, they have the potential to erode the craft
skills that should control most decisions, and thereby justify the
public skepticism about the fairness and impartiality of judges.
Another set of problematic values may also play a role in
the decisionmaking process of judges. These values "derive[]
from the social, economic, and political background of the
judge."' 19 One judge may have been a prosecutor, another a
defense lawyer. Judges have different religious affiliations.
Some judges have spent most of their professional lives in the
corporate world, while others have used their legal skills on
behalf of consumers or the indigent. It is pointless to deny that
these experiences affect the mind-set of a judge. But Judge
Coffin suggests that "[tihe difference between the good judge
and the poor one is not that the former has been sterilized of all
taint of his own experience but that he knows his enemy,
himself, and is on guard.
20
Finally, Judge Coffin describes a third set of values, which
fall into the categories of Process and Substance.
16. Id. at 199.
17. Id. at 201.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 202.
20. Id. at 202-03.
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Acknowledging the essential "mystery" of the differing appeal
of these values to different judges, "[t]he fact is that judges often
differ in the weights they assign to certain values in the judicial
process. ' 21 In reviewing the same case, one judge may
emphasize the importance of finality and deference to the trial
judge, while another may focus on the unfairness of the
outcome. These inclinations may be the result of the differing
social and economic backgrounds of the judges, or their
different law practices, or even their differing views of the role
of courts, but it would be difficult to characterize either
inclination as unworthy. As Judge Coffin puts it, each
inclination "reflects a value with a positive weight.,
22
So where does this recognition of the tension between craft
skills and values in some cases leave Judge Coffin in his quest to
legitimize the work of the Third Branch? For a start, with no
patience for those who see in this tension proof of the
illegitimacy of the decisionmaking of federal appellate judges:
It is my thesis that the common view of the problem is
distorted, and, because it is, the search for principles to
harness judges is conducted in too strident a manner and
with simplistic and absolutist expectations that are
unrealistic.2
3
These critics ignore the many restraints on the decisionmaking
of appellate judges, which include
the need to convince a majority of any appellate court; the
discipline of putting facts, reasoning, and conclusions in
writing; the existence of well-recognized rules of the
judging craft; the possibility of review by the Supreme
Court; and criticism by the bar, law school faculties, and
the academic journals .... [J]udges [also] are subjected to
the most demanding ethical code in government.
24
As for those critics who insist that legitimacy depends on a
judge's adherence to "neutral principles" of law, or judicial
restraint, or some overarching philosophy of judicial
decisionmaking, their expectations are misguided. The reality is
that "the counsel of restraint, like the counsel of adherence to
21. Id. at 203.
22. Id. at 203-04.
23. Id. at 216.
24. Id. at218.
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neutral principles, either may not give clear direction [in
particular cases] or, when it does give direction, is not a value-
free approach to deciding cases."
25
Although Judge Coffin acknowledges the contributions of
successive or competing judicial philosophies (Sociological
Jurisprudence, Legal Realism, Legal Process, the individual-
oriented jurisprudence of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin),26 he
remains skeptical of the sufficiency for the working judge of one
overarching approach to judicial decisionmaking. Instead, he
opts for pluralism.
I find merit in one school for a certain range of problems
and merit in another for another range. Where the ranges
seem to overlap in my mind, I have to choose between sets
of principles or systems, well knowing that my very
eclecticism clashes with the fundamental tenets of most of
the competing systems.
27
This pluralism, in turn, leads Judge Coffin to a definition of
judging that brings him back, in part, to the importance of craft:
Judging is most certainly not a matter of mystical
revelation. Neither is it all logic or all science. Nor is it all a
matter of institutional competence or a search for neutral
principles. Finally, it is not the systematic application of a
comprehensive theory of social utility or moral values.
Judging is a mixture of all of these, the formula for the
wisest and most just mixture remaining as yet unrevealed.
We know that the good judge diligently applies himself to
the disciplines and skills of the craft .... We realize, too,
that the judge, laboring in the vineyard of specific disputes,
finds himself working out practical solutions and crafting
tailored remedies that are calculated to recognize rights and
at the same time resect the need for responsible
governance and direction.
In light of this definition of judging, and its pluralistic
nature, it seems fair to ask if Judge Coffin has met the challenge
he posed for himself when he described the publication in 1880
of The Common Law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., as "the
25. Id. at 220.
26. Id. at 231-41 (Chapter 13: "A Judge Seeks His Bearings").
27. Id. at 241.
28. Id. at 245.
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moment of truth., 29 Given the revelation by Holmes that judges
are not oracles who find and interpret "a mystical body of
permanent truth," but instead "reflect personal values in
exercising the 'sovereign prerogative of choice,"' 30 it follows,
Judge Coffin writes, that "suitable principles for controlling and
limiting the scope of such choices must be found. If not, this
country would find itself in the anomalous position of having
granted open-ended power to its least democratic element."
31
Superficially, pluralism seems an inadequate principle for
controlling the open-ended power of federal judges. But Judge
Coffin's pluralism is the antithesis of the arbitrary
decisionmaking that would make judicial power deeply
problematic. The choice for Judge Coffin among competing
answers in a particular case is the result of a disciplined, self-
aware inquiry. He relies primarily on craft skills to narrow his
choices. He exposes and excises prejudices masking as values.
He acknowledges and assesses legitimate values for relevance
and weight. Then he explains his choices by writing a carefully
reasoned, fully stated opinion that imposes more discipline on
the decisionmaking process. Writ large, this disciplined, self-
aware, ultimately transparent process of deciding cases is itself
an important controlling principle that serves in substantial
measure to legitimize the open-ended power of federal judges.
Still, if this reliance on a craft-oriented process of judicial
decisionmaking, infused by the selective application of
competing judicial philosophies, seems anticlimactic for those
who expected a more definitive answer to the secret of judging,
Judge Coffin is unapologetic. There is simply not one "'right
approach for all judges. 2 Instead, there is only the continuing
quest of judges to improve the quality of their work. To make
his point, Judge Coffin wrote another book.
ONAPPEAL: COURTS, LA WYERING, AND JUDGING
To some extent, as Judge Coffin acknowledges, he wrote
29. Id. at 208.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 249.
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On Appeal because of the challenge posed in a book review by a
fellow judge and good friend. The reviewer commented that
Judge Coffin had offered in The Ways of a Judge "'no insight
into the formula for judging, saying only that it remains
"unrevealed .... 33 He then added: "'I would have welcomed
some suggestion, however tentative, of Judge Coffin's personal
thoughts about how to decide [difficult] cases.' 34
Difficult cases can, of course, take many forms. There are
cases involving statutory interpretation, where the language at
issue is ambiguous (often because of a legislative compromise),
the statutory scheme is intricate, and the legislative history is
voluminous and inconclusive. There are civil rights and
employment discrimination cases, disposed of by summary
judgment rulings, where well-developed doctrines must be
applied to massive records. There are lengthy criminal trials
plagued by erroneous evidentiary rulings that raise the often
elusive question of harmless error.
But these difficult cases, largely resolvable by the
application of a judge's craft skills (interpreting statutes, reading
records), are not the difficult cases Judge Coffin's friend has in
mind. Instead, he is referring to the type of case identified by
Judge Coffin himself at the end of Ways of a Judge, where he
wrote that the "most elusive mission [of all judges] is that of
safeguarding individual rights in a majoritarian society with due
regard to the legitimate interests of that society. The search for
the approach most likely to accomplish this mission seems to be
never-ending."
35
The cases that present this elusive mission often involve the
application of the great generalities of the Constitution, where
the precedents of the Supreme Court are uncertain and the
appellate judge's craft skills do not provide the answers.
Drawing on beliefs about the proper role of judges in our federal
system, or lessons of history, or their own life experiences, or
worries about undermining the authority of the police or the
33. On Appeal, supra n. 2, at 231.
34. Id. (quoting Alvin B. Rubin, Book Reviews: The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from
the Federal Appellate Bench and Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System: A
Study of the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 220, 224
(1981)).
35. The Ways of a Judge, supra n. 1, at 249.
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operations of government, or instincts of uncertain origin, some
judges almost always decide these difficult cases in favor of the
government. Other judges, drawing on similar sources but
different concerns and instincts, decide more often in favor of
the individual. Different values are in play in these cases, and it
is disingenuous to claim otherwise.
But as Judge Coffin emphasizes in Ways of a Judge, some
values are legitimate (favoring finality in judicial proceedings
over the fairness of an outcome) while others are unworthy
prejudices (disliking a class of plaintiffs or their cause). Again,
what matters in these difficult cases involving the government
and individual rights is the judge's self-awareness about the
values affecting the decisionmaking, the legitimacy of those
values, their interplay with the craft skills that are always
important to the decisionmaking process, and the ability of the
judge to write a careful, transparent decision that displays the
craft skills at work, excises the unworthy values, and
acknowledges the legitimate values that influenced the decision.
In the closing pages of On Appeal, Judge Coffin tries "to
isolate and identify the cardinal beacons or values that I look to
for direction in deciding constitutional cases posing a conflict
between individual rights and state or societal interests, if and
when I am not tightly confined by precedent." 36 These four
beacons are liberty (central to our constitutional
arrangements),37 equality (not mentioned in the Constitution
"because it was as circumambient and pervasive . . . as the
air"), 38 workability (which "couples a sensitivity to individual
rights with an equal sensitivity to administrative capability to
carry out institutional missions while affording optimum respect
for those rights," 39 and community (an emergent but seldom
recognized value in most adjudications).4 °
36. On Appeal, supra n. 2, at 281.
37. Id. at 281.
38. Id. at 282.
39. Id. at 285.
40. Id. at 293. Elaborating on this last value, Judge Coffin explains it as:
the self-interest a society has in preserving itself against the instability,
insecurity, and disintegration threatened by the emergence, enlargement, and
perpetuation of a very substantial underclass of uneducated, job-unqualified,
welfare-dependent, unhealthy, despairing people living in dysfunctional
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Judge Coffin acknowledges that "[m]erely identifying
one's basic values does not go very far in illuminating how one
would deal with hard cases of the type we are considering. My
responsibility, therefore, is to try to bring some concreteness out
of abstraction., 41 He does this, in part, by describing what he
calls a "rights-sensitive balancing process," which,
if it is conscientiously done, . . . not only will result in
better decisions, more faithful to our constitutional
mandates, but will elevate the dialogue among judges and
increase the chances of understanding and consensus on the
part of people generally.
42
Not surprisingly, this process relies heavily on the craft
skills that are so important to the legitimacy of an appellate
judge's work. That is, the process requires a close, clear-eyed
analysis of the details of the case in order to gauge accurately
the competing interests at stake. The court must assess the
"centrality and importance [of the individual right at stake], the
extent to which it is likely to be infringed, and the frequency of
infringement, '43 as well as the effects on the government of
recognizing the right. The adequacy of the record before the
court in such cases is particularly important because, if the
factual basis for a broad decision is lacking, "the decision may
paint with far too broad a brush, with far-reaching damage.
The court must also recognize the larger societal stakes in the
protection of individual rights: "If a protectible individual right
is at stake, society has a genuine interest in that right, as well as
the individual; both interests must then be weighed against the
countervailing institutional interest of society."
Although Judge Coffin's friend might not be reassured by
the description of this balancing process at work in three
decisions that Judge Coffin wrote, each of which was directly or
families, all too susceptible to drugs and crime, with no sense of participation in,
access to, or fealty toward that society.
Id. at 293-94.
41. Id. at 286.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 289.
44. Id. at 288.
45. Id. at 287.
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46implicitly overturned by a subsequent Supreme Court decision,
he would probably acknowledge the usefulness of Judge
Coffin's approach to these difficult cases. Balancing tests, so
prevalent in Supreme Court jurisprudence, are an unavoidable
response to two realities-the generality of the constitutional
language protecting individual rights, and the plausible claim of
the government that the specific recognition of those generalities
in the case at hand is incompatible with important, perhaps even
indispensable, government functions. If judges are to avoid
ready deference to the claims of government administrators,
thereby making themselves irrelevant, or quick hostility to those
claims, thereby making themselves obstructionist, they must
operate in that middle terrain described by Judge Coffin, where
the judge's craft skills are so essential to the quality of the
judge's work. Applying a Supreme Court balancing test in a
difficult constitutional case is a craft skill. Incorporating Judge
Coffin's "rights-sensitive balancing process" into that analysis is
an important refinement of that skill.
To be sure, as the very name of the process suggests, it
includes a tilt. It is called the "rights-sensitive balancing
46. In the earliest of these decisions, Drown v. Portsmouth Sch. Dist., 435 F.2d 1182
(1st Cir. 1970), a nontenured public-school teacher claimed that she was denied due
process when the school district refused to renew her contract without giving any reasons
for its decision. The panel concluded that "the benefits to the teacher of a statement of
reasons for nonretention were so substantial and the inconvenience to the school board so
slight that due process required it." On Appeal, supra n. 1, at 290. The case was effectively
overruled by Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held
that a nontenured college professor had no protectible liberty or property interest that
required a statement of reasons for nonrenewal of the professor's contract.
In Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), the
First Circuit affirmed a ruling barring a proposed transfer of inmates from a medium-
security institution to a maximum-security prison for reported misconduct because the
transfer, without an opportunity to respond to the allegations, would violate due process.
Judge Coffin explained that, in balancing the interests, the court considered that "the prison
system itself had decided that it could live with the requirement [of a hearing] without
difficulty." On Appeal, supra n. 2, at 291. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause did not require a transfer hearing. 427 U.S. at 229.
Ten years later, the court held in Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), that a criminal suspect's right to counsel and privilege against
self-incrimination had been violated when the police falsely told his attorney that they were
"'through with him for the night,' did not tell the suspect of the call, and then proceeded to
take three inculpatory statements." On Appeal, supra n. 2, at 292. The Supreme Court held
that "the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Federal Constitution required the
exclusion [from evidence at trial] of the three exculpatory statements." 475 U.S. at 434.
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process," not the "government-sensitive balancing process."
Judge Coffin warns repeatedly against a "policy of blanket
deference to officialdom." 47 In the realm of equal protection
analysis, he is skeptical about the defensibility of the minimum
rationality standard:
[I]f an individual is adversely affected by legislation, more
so than others, is it really faithful to our basic charter of
rights to uphold the legislation if a court can hypothesize a
possible rational basis or purpose of the legislation, even if
such reasoning had played no part in its enactment?
48
He adds: "Perhaps the time will soon arrive when our higher
expectations of the capacity of government to respect individual
rights will declare the concept of minimum rationality
obsolete., 49 And he describes "the Constitution-the original
document, the Bill of Rights, the Civil War and other
amendments-as a profoundly rights-oriented charter."
50
In short, the tilt in Judge Coffin's rights-sensitive balancing
process is a tilt grounded in the Constitution itself. That tilt does
not justify anything less than a rigorous analysis by judges of the
details of the individual and governmental interests at stake
when they clash. It does not mean that the balancing analysis
will always fall one way. But the tilt does remind judges, and the
larger public that Judge Coffin hoped to reach with his book,
that a crucial premise of our constitutional system is a federal
judiciary willing to resist legislative or executive action when it
threatens core constitutional values involving individual rights.
As Judge Coffim makes clear in On Appeal, a judiciary up to that
task should be celebrated, not condemned.
CONCLUSION
With typical modesty, Judge Coffin minimized the
achievement of On Appeal with a comment that he would
probably have applied to both of his books:
47. On Appeal, supra n. 2, at 284.
48. Id. at 285.
49. Id. at 285-86.
50. Id. at 281.
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The most resistant task I have faced in writing this book has
been to try to identify anything particularly individualistic
and interesting about how I go about my work in deciding
appeals. What I am about to say is all that I can confidently
claim. And I know that it is neither terribly original nor
illuminating. But it is all I can offer.
51
Judge Coffin was far too modest. Although his accounts of
his own decisionmaking process may not be original in the pure
sense, they are illuminating for those of us who go from decision
to decision with scant awareness of the patterns in our own
decisionmaking. This lack of awareness does not mean that our
decisions are wrong or unworthy of respect. Most of our
decisions will reflect the craft skills which, as Judge Coffin
pointed out, decide most cases. But for those exceptional cases
in which craft skills only take us so far, and the pivot points of
our decision become more elusive, Judge Coffin's lucid
exploration of his own decisionmaking reminds us that we can
improve our work by thinking more systematically about it.
Even if the values that we identify through such introspection
still seem appropriate, or our location on Judge Coffin's
Procedure-Substance spectrum still seems about right, our
increased self-awareness about our own thought processes
should allow us to achieve the qualities in our written decisions
that Judge Coffin so valued: openness and carefulness.52
Judge Coffin prized these qualities in judicial opinions
because they advance the goal at the heart of his books-
enhancing the legitimacy of an independent judiciary. Drawing
on his years in politics and elective office, Judge Coffin
understands that the public will value an independent judiciary
for the same reason it values other governmental institutions-
its belief that such an institution promotes and protects the
51. Id. at 262.
52. In defining these qualities, Judge Coffin incorporates his vision of appellate
decisionmaking:
By openness I mean laying on the table the opinion writer's real reasons and
thought processes, for without this there is little chance of meaningful dialogue
or consensus. I realize that the ultimate work product of a court may, in order to
gain a majority, be more opaque, but in the beginning there should be candor. By
carefulness, I mean a self-conscious craftsmanship at every stage of the decision
process, rejecting unspoken or facile assumptions and generalizations, and a
fairness in stating issues, facts, and arguments.
Id. at 286.
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public interest. To be sure, judges have a more difficult time
explaining their role to the public because judges cannot equate
the public interest with the majority. Instead, there are times
when the majority must understand the societal stake in the
protection of individual rights. Any attempt by judges to mask
that reality is unwise. As Judge Coffin sees it, "a more
perceptive view of the nature of appellate decision-making on
the part of lay persons" will improve the quality of citizenship
and will also "become[] a subtle yet powerful force for
improving the quality of judges and their work. 53
There are many in our society who will never be reconciled
to the independence of the federal judiciary. There are
politicians who will always inveigh against judicial activism and
judicial legislators whenever they see a decision they do not
like. But this inevitability does not mean that judges should cede
the defense of their work to academics, members of the bar, or
supportive politicians. Judges have their own responsibility to
explain what they do, how they do it, and why their independent
role matters.
For judges, the best defense of their role is the quality of
the work that they do. For appellate judges, most of what we do
is write opinions. Although the primary purpose of Judge
Coffin's books was to illuminate for the public a process they
rarely see from the inside, his descriptions of his own approach
to decisionmaking and opinion writing also instruct judges on
pathways to improved performance. That objective and that
lesson are complementary. If the public has a better
understanding of what appellate judges do, how they do it, and
why their independence matters, and if the judges write
transparent, carefully composed opinions that reveal and explain
the craft skills and values in play, they may persuade more
members of an enlightened public that the legitimacy of the
judiciary's work does not depend on the popularity of its
opinions.
That was certainly Judge Coffin's faith in writing these two
superb books. In lesser hands, that faith might seem fanciful. In
Judge Coffin's hands, that faith is irresistible.
53. The Ways of a Judge, supra n. 1, at 249.
